Abstract. In scientific collaborations, provenance is increasingly used to understand, debug, and explain the processing history of data, and to determine the validity and quality of data products. While provenance is easily recorded by scientific workflow systems, it can be infeasible or undesirable to publish provenance details for all data products of a workflow run. We have developed PROPUB, a system that allows users to publish a customized version of their data provenance, based on a set of publication and customization requests, while observing certain provenance publication policies, expressed as logic integrity constraints. When user requests conflict with provenance policies, repair actions become necessary. In prior work, we removed additional parts of the provenance graph (i.e., not directly requested by the user) to repair constraint violations. In this paper, we present an alternative approach, which ensures that all relevant nodes are retained in the provenance graph. The key idea is to introduce new anonymous nodes to represent lineage dependencies, without revealing information that the user wants to protect. With this new approach, a user may now explore different provenance publication strategies, and choose the most appropriate one before publishing sensitive provenance data.
Introduction
In the emerging paradigm of collaborative, data-intensive science, sharing data products even prior to publication may be desirable [1, 2] . Yet, without a proper scientific publication associated with shared data, its validity and accuracy is difficult to assess. This is problematic in collaborative environments, where data shared by one scientist is used by another scientist as input for further studies. In such settings, data provenance (the lineage and processing history of data) can help to ensure data quality [3, 4, 5, 6, 7] . It is thus desirable to publish data products together with their provenance. In many cases, however, provenance data can be sensitive and may contain private information or intellectual property that should not be revealed [7, 8, 5] . Consequently, one has to balance between (i) the desire to publish provenance data so that collaborators can understand and rely on the shared data products, and (ii) the need to protect sensitive information, e.g., due to privacy concerns or intellectual property issues ( Figure 1 ).
We view provenance as a bipartite, directed, acyclic graph, capturing which data nodes were consumed and produced, respectively, by invocation nodes (computations). Our model thus corresponds to the Open Provenance Model (OPM) which captures the dependencies between data artifacts and process invocations [9] . To sanitize provenance graphs, a scientist can remove sensitive data nodes or invocations nodes from the provenance graph. Alternatively, she can abstract a set of sensitive nodes by grouping them into a single, abstract node. These updates may violate some of the integrity constraints of the provenance graph [10] . For example, grouping multiple nodes into one abstraction node may introduce new dependencies, which were absent in the initial provenance graph. Hiding nodes may also make some nodes in the final graph appear independent of each other even though they are dependent in the original graph. Thus, one can no longer trust that the published provenance data is "correct" (e.g., there are no false dependencies) or "complete" (e.g., there are no false independencies). Therefore, we propose a system that allows a publisher to provide a high-level specification what parts of the provenance graph are to be published and what parts are to be sanitized, while guaranteeing that at the same time certain provenance publication constraints are observed.
Motivating Example
Figure 2(a) shows a simplified version of the provenance graph (PG) from the First Provenance Challenge [11] . Scientific workflow systems often automatically record such provenance [12, 13] , and the provenance graphs may resemble the workflow graph, i.e., the former can be seen as instances of the latter [2] . At the workflow specification level, actors are used to represent the computational steps, implemented by software components, while at the provenance (or instance) level, we have invocations of those actors. We depict data nodes as circles and invocation nodes as boxes. Dependencies among them are shown as directed edges. These edges capture the lineage of data nodes and thus are typically drawn from right (newer nodes) to left (older nodes), i.e., in the opposite direction of the dataflow edges in a workflow specification. For example, d 16 was generated by an invocation s 2 , and was in turn used by invocation c 2 , denoted by, data nodes {d11, d12} are sensitive, (ii) nodes {m1, d14, s1} are low level details (i.e. not very useful) for the intended user, and (iii) nodes {c1, d15, c2} are proprietary. shown in Figure 2 (a). A recursive query is used to retrieve all the data and invocation nodes upstream from d 18 and d 19 , i.e., the nodes on which the latter depend. The resulting subgraph (PG ) is shown in Figure 2 (b). Note that the lineage of d 20 up to s 3 is not in the lineage of d 18 and d 19 and hence not included in PG . Further assume that before publishing PG , the user also wants to sanitize the provenance data as it may have various privacy issues as shown in Figure 2 (b). Figure 3 shows the provenance graph we get after sanitation by (i) removing the value refenences from data nodes d 11 and d 12 , (ii) abstracting nodes m 1 , d 14 , and s 1 into a group node g 1 , and (iii) removing nodes c 1 , d 18 , and c 2 . In this modified provenance graph, we see that there is a cycle between the data node d 13 and invocation node g 1 ; a type error for the edge between invocation nodes s 2 and g 1 (the graph should be bipartite); and there are no dependencies from data nodes d 18 and d 19 to the rest of the graph. Thus, we need a systematic way to customize provenance while respecting general properties of the graph (e.g., acyclicity, bipartiteness) and while preserving correctness and completeness of the remaining provenance information.
In this work, we develop a strategy to (i) hide sensitive information as specified by the user, (ii) maintain all relevant nodes, which do not have low level details or proprietary information, in the customize provenance graph, (iii) maintain the original direct and transitive dependencies among the relevant nodes, and (iv) produce only graphs that comply with the structural properties of provenance graphs (acyclicity and bipartiteness).
Outline. In Section 3, we describe the provenance model, user requests and provenance policies, and the logical architecture of the framework. Section 4 presents our key ideas, and techniques to solve individual policy violations by introducing new, anonymous nodes. We discuss related work and conclude in Section 5.
Provenance Publisher
In our recent work, we developed the system PROPUB [10] , which uses a declarative approach to publish customized policy-aware provenance. PROPUB accepts a provenance graph and three inputs: (1) user requests to publish and customize provenance, (2) provenance policies, modeled as integrity constraints aiming to ensure the validity of the customized provenance graph, and (3) a (total) preference order among provenance policies. PROPUB checks whether all user requests and provenance policies can be satisfied together. If not, the approach selects a subset of requests and policies according to the user-specified ranking. The outputs of PROPUB are the customized provenance graph, as well as a list of satisfied and ignored user requests and policies.
In this work, we present an extension to PROPUB that invents new, anonymous nodes that are inserted in the customized graph. We show that with this technique, it is possible to always satisfy all user requests and policies simultaneously, without the need of a user-specified preference order. For example, by subsequently applying the user requests in a specific way, none of the provenance policies as described in Table 3 will be violated.
Provenance Model. Our provenance model is based on the Open Provenance Model OPM [14] and our earlier work [15] : A provenance (or lineage) graph is an acyclic graph P G = (V, E), where the nodes V = D ∪ I represent either data items D or actor invocations I. The graph G is bipartite, i.e., the edges E = E use ∪ E gby are either used edges E use ⊆ I × D or generated-by edges E gby ⊆ D × I. Here, a used edge (i, d) ∈ E means that invocation i has read d as part of its input, while a generated-by edge (d, i) ∈ E means that d was output data, written by invocation i. Data and invocation nodes have opaque identifiers. We use the relations data and actor to map each data and invocation node to a URL where the data value can be retrieved or the implenting actor identified. The PROPUB Datalog implementation uses the schema shown in Table 1 .
User Requests. Table 2 summarizes the user requests supported by our system. User requests are asserted as relational facts, which together with PROPUB rules can be used by a Datalog rule engine to infer additional facts or to check integrity constraints. A user request can be a publication request or a customization request. Figure 4 shows examples of publication and customization requests. The relation lineage defines the user's initial publication requests. The relations abstract, hide, and anonymize are used to abstract the nodes with low level details, to remove proprietary nodes, and to remove the value references from the sensitive nodes, respectively.
Relation
Description used(I, D) An edge specifying that the invocation I used the data artifact D. gen by(D, I) An edge to indicate that the data artifact D was generated by invocation I. actor(I, A) An invocation node I, which was executed by actor A. data(D, R) A data artifact node D, whose value can be retrieved using the reference R.
dep(X, Y)
Combined dependency relation dep = used ∪ gen by. Specifies that node X depends on node Y, irrespective of their types. Selects the complete lineage for the data artifact D ur:anonymize(N) Erases the actor/process identity or the data reference from the node N ur:hide(N) Removes the invocation or data node N ur:abstract(N, G) Collapses all nodes N to the abstract group G Table 2 . User requests for lineage publication and customization Provenance Policies. As mentioned above, a provenance graph is a bipartite DAG in our model. Moreover, an invocation can read (i.e., use) many data artifacts, but a data artifact is generated by exactly one invocation. We use three provenance policies, represented as logical integrity constraints, to verify if these structural properties are satisfied in the customized provenance graph CG that results from applying all customization requests to PG . The framework supports two more provenance policies to ensure the correctness and completeness of information, see Table 3 .
We use a set of integrity constraints (ICs) to check whether the provenance policies defined in Table 3 are satisfied. Table 4 
Logical Architecture
The logical architecture of the framework is shown in Figure 5 . The user submits a set of publication and customization requests U 0 . The module Direct-Conflict-Detection detects direct conflicts among the given user-requests. For example, a ur:hide and a ur:lineage request on the same node are directly in conflict. The user then needs to update her original requests until all direct conflicts are resolved, resulting in a consistent, conflict-free user request U. The Lineage-Selection module computes the subgraph PG , containing all to-be-published data items together with their data lineage.
The User-Request-Application module applies all the ur:hide, ur:abstract, and ur:anonymize requests in U on PG . It deletes from PG all data and invocation nodes selected by the ur:hide and ur:abstract requests, together with their associated gen by and used edges. This module then applies the ur:anonymize requests to remove value references (in case of a data node) or references to the source code Fig. 2(b) , can be hidden using the ur:hide user request. (b) User requests represented as Datalog facts: e.g., to abstract nodes {m1, d14, s1} into an abstract node g1, we use abstract(m1, g1), abstract(d14, g1), and abstract(s1, g1). The module prefix "ur:" is optional here.
Provenance Policy Description No-Write Conflict (NWC)
A data artifact can be written by only one invocation. No-Cyclic Dependency (NCD) There is no cycle in the provenance graph.
No-Type Error (NTE) Bipartite graph: edges only between data and invocations. No-False Dependence (NFD) Two nodes are dependent in CG only if they are dependent in PG. No-False Independence (NFI) Two nodes are independent in CG only if they are independent in PG. Table 3 . Provenance Policies (in case of an invocation node). As this module deletes nodes and incident edges, two relevant nodes may now appear independent, even though they were dependent in PG . The Dependency-Injection module connects all relevant nodes in the customized provenance graph CG by reproducing the same dependencies as found originally in PG . While connecting nodes, this module introduces anonymous nodes to avoid cycledependency, type-error, write-conflict, and false-dependency constraint violations.
The final output, the customized provenance graph CG, satisfies all the provenance policies mentioned in Table 3 , honors all the conflict-free user requests, and maintains all relevant nodes.
Approach
The basic idea of our approach is to first remove data or invocation nodes based on the user's hide and abstract requests, and then to connect the remaining nodes using three key ideas: (i) maintain all relevant nodes, (ii) maintain their dependencies, and (iii) invent new, anonymous nodes to avoid policy violations.
Maintain Relevant Nodes. In case nodes have sensitive or proprietary information, or simply too much, low level details (cf. [16] ), the user can request those nodes to be removed, abstracted, or anonymized using the requests described above. All the data and invocation nodes, which are not selected using ur:abstract or ur:hide are considered relevant nodes to the user. Our approach does not remove any of these nodes from PG and in turn maintains them in CG.
Maintain Dependencies. While removing nodes from PG , as a consequence of the user's customization requests, we also remove the associated gen by and used edges. This may make CG incomplete (i.e., dependencies are omitted) as shown in Fig. 3 . Our framework avoids these provenance policy violations by maintaining the dependencies among the relevant nodes as described in Section 4.2.
Inventing New Nodes. While connecting the remaining data and invocation nodes, the framework may invent new nodes to avoid policy violations (e.g., an invocation node is invented to connect two data nodes to avoid NTE violations, i.e., type errors). New nodes can be data or invocation nodes and have no relation to any of the nodes being replaced. In particular, new nodes are anonymous, i.e., do not have references associated, so that no sensitive information is revealed, as requested by the user. Fig. 6 . An invocation node is invented to connect two data nodes, avoiding a NTE violation. Fig. 7 . Two data nodes are invented between invocation nodes, avoiding a NWC violation.
Dealing with Structural Constraint Violations
Before describing our approach in detail (see Section 4.2), we first provide an overview of the possible remedies that we can use to deal with certain constraint violations.
No-Type Error. This policy is violated in case there is a direct dependency between two nodes of the same type (i.e., a direct dependency between data nodes or invocation nodes). While connecting two data nodes, our framework invents an invocation node to avoid this policy violation as shown in Fig. 6 . Similarly, the framework invents a data node to connect two invocation nodes.
No-Write Conflict. If a data node depends on two different invocation nodes (i.e., the data node is generated by two different invocations), this policy is violated. This may occur when inventing a data node and connecting it with two or more gen by edges to maintain dependencies. While adding edges to an invented data node or connecting a disconnected relevant data node, our framework ensures that only one gen by edge is added. Thus, our framewrok avoids this policy violation as shown in Fig. 7 .
No-False Independence. This policy is violated if two nodes are dependent in PG , but appear independent in CG. This may occur as a result of user requests, as shown in Fig. 8 . Our framework connects the corresponding nodes in CG, to preserve the dependence present in PG .
No-False Dependence. This policy is violated if two nodes are independent in PG , but appear dependent in CG (Fig. 9 ). Our framework avoids this conflict by connecting the relevant nodes using a number of anonymous nodes to preserve the dependencies in CG as they were in PG (see Section 4.2 for details).
No-Cyclic Dependency. This policy is violated, if there is a cyclic dependency in the provenance graph, i.e., there are nodes in the graph that depend on themselves (either directly or indirectly via other nodes). 3 If the original PG was acyclic, then the resulting graph CG will also be acylic, as we do not introduce cycles between nodes from PG , nor do we introduce cycles involving newly inserted nodes. 
Module Implementation
We now provide more details about each of the modules mentioned in Section 3.1. In our framework, the provenance graph PG and user requests U 0 are given as logic facts (EDB or base relations in Datalog parlance). All four modules in our framework are specified declaratively, as a set of Datalog rules that are evaluated over PG and U 0 , to derive the customized provenance graph CG. The modules Direct-Conflict-Detection and Lineage-Selection are implemented using Datalog rules as shown in our earlier work [10] . The lineage subgraph PG , expressed as the dependency relation dep', is calculated (based on the ur:lineage publication user requests) as follows:
Note that dep' is not the transitive closure of dep but rather the subgraph of edges in dep that is reachable from the nodes in lineage that the user requested to be published. User-Request-Application. This module accepts the provenance graph PG and the conflict-free user requests as inputs. It removes from PG the nodes selected by the ur:abstract and ur:hide requests and their incident edges. For example, the following rules are used to apply the ur : hide user requests: In a similay way, ur:abstract user requests are applied. This module then applies all the ur:anonymize user requests by removing the references to the value for the selected data nodes and removing the references to the source code for the selected actor nodes. At the end of this module, we get a graph with only relevant nodes, in which some of them are anonymized. However, many of the dependencies among relevant nodes in PG may now be missing in this graph.
Dependency-Injection. The objectives of this module are to (i) connect all the relevant nodes (bringing back lost dependencies) using a minimum number of invented nodes, and (ii) maintain the original direct and transitive dependencies among the remaining nodes. This module performs a 3-stage process to achieve these goals. We describe the stages below:
In the first stage, the framework develops in and out sets as shown in Fig. 10 . Here in is a set of relevant nodes (those in dep ), on which one or more nodes from the del node relation are dependent, while out is a set of relevant nodes, which are dependent on one or more nodes in the del node set. In our running example from Fig. 4(a) , we have in = {d 9 
The framework also calculates an in dep relation for each node in out: in dep (o,i) holds for a node o ∈ out, if o depends (directly or transitively) on i ∈ in.
Given o ∈ out, the in dep set (for o) is the set of inputs i on which o depends, i.e., in dep o = {i ∈ in | in dep(o, i) holds}. For example, data node d 19 is dependent on all the members of the in set (see Fig. 10 ).
We use the following Datalog rules 5 to calculate in, out, and in dep:
In the second stage, the framework analyzes the dependencies among the nodes of a specific in dep o set of a node o. In case there is a node i ∈ in dep o which depends on another node i ∈ in dep o , the framework removes i from in dep o . All these i nodes in in dep o are called redundant for the node o. The reason is that when o depends on i, then o will also transitively depend on i (in a sense, i is "covered" by i, since the lineage of i includes the lineage of i ). For example, node d 18 from the out set has an in dep set with nodes d 9 , d 10 , d 11 , d 12 and d 13 . Now, since d 13 is dependent on all of d 9 , d 10 , d 11 , and d 12 as shown in Fig. 4(a) , the framework optimizes this in dep set by removing all nodes except the node d 13 . This process is performed for all elements from the out set. The result is shown in Fig. 11(a) .
Next, we check if there is any (transitive) dependency that uses only non-deleted nodes and edges between a node from the out set and the nodes of its in dep set. In case there is, the respective node from the in dep set is removed, since the required dependency is already present in the graph.
For example, there is a direct dependency from s 2 to d 13 . Thus d 13 is removed from the in dep set of the invocation node s 2 . Finally, if an in dep set for an out node becomes empty, the node is removed from the out set. This is the case for the invocation node s 2 as shown in Fig. 11(b) . Since there is already an edge between s 2 and d 13 , the framework does not add an additional edge.
In the third and final stage, we invent one data node for each invocation node A in the in set and updates all the in dep sets by replacing X with the respective newly invented data node D = f(A) while keeping the dependencies by connecting D with A. This is done to avoid type-errors. The Datalog rules are as follows:
We can now calculate distinct in dep sets using the following Datalog rules: Here, the unique relation provides the list of out nodes with unique in dep sets. The relation same in dep pairs out nodes having the same in dep sets.
We then invents on data node f(Y) for each unique same in dep group Y, and inserts edges between f(Y) and all invocation nodes in this group:
Finally, we invent one invocation node for each same in dep group, and insert dependency edges to connect the nodes in in and out based on the in dep; see The result of this module is a graph with relevant and newly created nodes. For our example, it is shown in Fig. 13 . PROPUB has removed all the nodes selected using the ur:abstract and ur:hide user requests and invented three anonymous node A, B, and C to maintain the dependencies among the relevant nodes. The framework also anonymized the data nodes d 11 and d 12 selected using ur:anonymize user requests.
Data provenance can be used in many ways, e.g., to interpret results, diagnose errors, fix bugs, improve reproducibility, and generally to build trust on the final data products and the underlying processes [3, 4, 5, 6, 7] . In addition, provenance information can be used to enhance exploratory processes [17, 18, 19] , and techniques have been developed to efficiently store and query provenance from scientific workflow runs [20, 21] .
With the increasing use of provenance information, privacy issues become more important as well [7, 8] . For example, provenance recorded by a scientific workflow system may carry sensitive information, such as data about human subjects in the case of biomedical studies, or proprietary information that a provenance provider might not want to reveal. By studying and analysing workflow provenance, one can, e.g., infer parts of the workflow specification or guess actor functionality from observing the relationships between inputs and outputs. The security view approach [5] limits the available provenance to a user by providing a partial view of the workflow through a role-based access control mechanism, and by defining a set of access permissions on actors, channels, and input/output ports as specified by the workflow owner at design time. The ZOOM * UserViews approach [16] allows to define a partial, zoomed-out view of a workflow, based on a user-defined distinction between relevant and irrelevant actors. Provenance information is restricted by the definition of that partial view of the workflow.
In our recent work [10] , we developed PROPUB, which uses a declarative approach to publish customized policy-aware provenance. Conflicts between user requests to hide or anonymize provenance information and provenance policies are resolved in [10] by removing additional nodes, beyond those requested by the user. In contrast, in this paper, we developed a new way to reconcile conflicts by inventing anonymous nodes that preserve the original lineage dependencies, without revealing information that the user wants to protect. Using this approach, we can now (i) honor all conflict-free user requests, (ii) comply with all provenance policies, (iii) maintain all relevant nodes in the final provenance graph, and (iv) maintain the original direct and transitive dependencies among the remaining nodes. Our current PROPUB system is based on the open provenance model (OPM). We plan to extend our prototype to include provenance model extensions, e.g., to support structured data items, e.g., nested data collections [21] .
